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ABSTRACT 
Several approaches can be considered to predict the evolution of computer 
security attacks, such as statistical approaches and “Red Teams.”  This research proposes 
a third and completely novel approach for predicting the evolution of an attack threat.  
Our goal is to move from the destructive nature and malicious intent associated with an 
attack to the root of what an attack creation is: having successfully solved a complex 
problem.  By approaching attacks from the perspective of the creator, we will chart the 
way in which attacks are developed over time and attempt to extract evolutionary patterns.  
These patterns will eventually be used for the prediction of future attacks. 
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Attack Evolution: 
Identifying Attack Evolution Characteristics to Predict Future Attacks 
 
An attack is a malicious act that attempts to exploit a weakness in a computer 
system.  Such a weakness is known as a security vulnerability.  Vulnerabilities are 
usually classified into host vulnerabilities, network vulnerabilities, and application 
vulnerabilities.  Host vulnerabilities are linked to potential attacks from insiders and lead 
to potential theft and abuse of privilege (i.e., improper use of authorized operations).  
Network vulnerabilities are linked to potential attacks from outsiders and lead to potential 
theft of privilege (i.e., unauthorized increase in privilege).  Like host vulnerabilities, 
application vulnerabilities allow a theft of privilege and an abuse of privilege.  An 
intrusion on a system can be seen as the exploitation of a vulnerability.  An intrusion 
results from an attack that has been, at least partially, successful.  An attack is thus an 
intrusion attempt.  
Computers are constantly being attacked.  The current state of computer security 
is mainly reactive.  When an attack appears, security companies receive samples of it, 
proceed to analyze the vulnerabilities being exploited, create patches for these 
vulnerabilities, and distribute the patches.  It is commonly thought that an attack will 
prosper once a vulnerability is reported and will die off once a patch is distributed.  
Arbaugh et al. (2000) found that this assumption is false.  Actually, patches are often 
available long before mass exploitations occur.  This may be due to the time delay that 
occurs between the release of a patch and the application of it by a majority of security  
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administrators.  This implies that to effectively defend an organization’s network against 
attacks, administrators should not only check for vulnerabilities, apply patches, and 
identify and clean infected computers, but should also assess how the attack threat against 
the organization’s network will evolve in order to prevent future attacks. 
Several approaches can be considered to predict the evolution of an attack threat. 
First, data on attacks can be collected and used to predict the attack threat evolution using  
various statistical approaches (e.g., chronological series).  This approach will only be able 
to predict attack threats based on previous attacks and will not be able to predict the 
occurrence of any novel attack.  Second, red teams (i.e., security experts hired to break 
into their organization’s network) can be used to check for vulnerabilities on the network 
and how to exploit them.  Once a vulnerability is identified, the development team must 
develop a patch to remove the vulnerability.  This approach is very expensive and 
depends on the quality of the red team.  It is also difficult to generalize the results from 
one organization to another.  
This research proposes a third and completely novel approach for predicting the 
evolution of the attack threat.  Currently, there is a strong focus on attacks because of the 
destructive consequences and the malicious intent.  Attacks are considered to be 
destructive and the attacker is viewed as someone who wants to harm the organization. 
An attack can be seen as an act of sabotage, but when reviewing sabotage acts, for 
example against companies, they often happen when someone is very upset or stressed  
(e.g., someone who has just been fired).  A person may try to harm their company by 
physically destroying some material; however, an employee would rarely sit down and  
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develop a sophisticated computer attack against the organization’s network.  Indeed, 
developing an attack is something very complex, requiring a lot of expertise and an 
environment favorable to such invention.  Our goal is to move from the destructive nature 
and malicious intent associated with an attack to the root of what attack creation is: 
having successfully solved a complex problem.  Then, attacks can be seen as the 
successful development of computer programs with, of course, a malicious intent. 
 In order to study the evolution of attacks, we approached attacks from the 
perspective of the attack creators.  We first studied the hacker society in order to 
understand what motivates attackers during attack creation.  We then reviewed a large set 
of attacks to understand the types of defining characteristics that change over time.  We 
developed a list of attack characteristics.  We selected two families of attacks, Klez and 
Bagle, and recorded the characteristics of each of the variants.  We then attempted to 
track changes and find evolutionary patterns.  This method can be applied to study other 
attack families as well.  Eventually, a new set of recent attacks will be studied and the 
patterns associated with these attacks will be identified.  This should lead to several 
evolutions of attacks and a method for predicting the types of future attacks that may 
occur on the Internet. 
 
PROCESS 
Hacker R & D 
To avoid focusing on the destructive nature of attacks and turn our attention 
towards attack evolution, we found it helpful to think by way of analogy.  Many reports  
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have been written in this way to create a broader understanding of computer security.  
Many reports, such as that by Forrest et al.(1997) speak about computer security and 
attacks in terms of immune systems and biological viruses.  These are helpful when 
thinking about how attacks spread; however, they did not prove to be helpful in guiding 
our thinking of evolution since they tend to emphasize the destructive effect of attacks.  
As an article on viral evolution (2004) points out, the danger of thinking in terms of 
evolution is the implication that attacks change on their own as an effect of their 
environment.  While attacks may evolve, it is important to remember that someone is 
driving this evolution behind the scenes.   
Gaines and Shapiro (1978) describe computer security in terms of criminals and 
physical security systems.  Their report stressed the importance of understanding the 
attackers’ point-of-view.  This was helpful to get us thinking about the various 
approaches one might use to disable or out-smart various types of security mechanisms.  
The importance of differentiating between premeditated and spur-of-the moment attacks 
was also stressed.  This is a key aspect in determining the type of attacks we will analyze, 
since only premeditated attacks have the potential for evolution. 
 We came to think of the hacker community as a team of researchers and 
developers.  Exploratory research is conducted by testing programs, scanning networks, 
and searching for vulnerabilities.  Someone writes an attack intended to exploit a given 
vulnerability.  The attack is the product.  Just as developers run tests on their product, the 
hacker will try the attack program on his own system.  Once satisfied, the attack will be  
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launched.  The developer then sits back and waits to see the effect of his product.  
Alterations will then be made to the product to better reach its goals.  Eventually, the 
developer will attempt to optimize functionality of all aspects of the finished product, 
thus creating a successful attack. 
The Hacker Underground 
To understand the way an attack is developed, it is necessary to understand the 
environment in which this development takes place.  We searched for reports that might 
bring us to an understanding of the hacker sub-culture that exists.  One sociological study, 
conducted by Jordan and Taylor (1998), allowed us to immerse ourselves in this 
underground society through analyses and interviews with hackers.  The primary 
motivation of hackers does not seem to be the possibility of massive destruction or gain, 
but rather the pure challenge of breaking into a system.  Because of this, information 
regarding coding, passwords and vulnerabilities is shared openly amongst hackers.  An 
intimate network of information sharing exists through groups, such as Phrack and 2600, 
magazines, meetings, chat rooms, and online message boards.  After accessing the hacker 
web pages, we were surprised to find that every few years 2600 even holds a large 
convention, HOPE (Hackers on Planet Earth).  By sharing attack knowledge, the group is 
able to advance collectively at a rapid pace. 
Hackers also share information regarding the attacks they achieve in order to gain 
recognition.  Prestige within the hacker community is gained when a hacker creates a 
noteworthy hack.  We contacted Tim Jordan to ask him how a hacker would know that 
his attack has been successful.  Jordan promptly responded that the difficulty is not to   
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know that one’s an attack is successful – this happens once the hacker gains the access or 
information intended by his attack.  Rather, the difficulty is to “prove to others that they 
were the author of a successful attack so that they can gain peer recognition (personal 
communication, July 8, 2006).”  The successful hackers who receive recognition are 
those that commit the majority of their time to hacking.  Due to the constant flux in 
information, only those who stay up to date – who we came to refer to as au courant 
hackers – can achieve success.  As one hacker stated in an interview, 
If you stop, if you don’t do it for one week then things change, the 
network always changes.  It changes very quickly and you have to 
keep up and you have to learn all the tricks by heart, the default  
passwords, the bugs you need (Jordan & Paul, 1998).   
The motivation of creating novel attacks combined with the constant collaboration within 
this community strengthens our theory that evolutionary patterns exist.   
We can think of hackers of two kinds: experts and amateurs.  Experts are the 
highly skilled people who create innovative attacks.  Amateurs will act as copy-cats of 
the expert attacks.  This explains why once a new attack arises, various similar attacks 
tend to follow.  Scripts – programs that allow for attack automation – allow even those 
with minimal knowledge to create attacks.  Typically, once a particular vulnerability is 
exploited many times, hackers seem to become bored with it and move on.  Jordan and 
Paul also point out that as an attack is duplicated, it loses prestige.  We will focus on 
prominent attacks, in order to see the work of the masters. 
Wilson (2001) stresses the distinction between outsider and insider attacks in his 
report of hacking.  Outsiders are responsible for any attack launched on a network from a 
remote source.  An example of an outsider attack is a mass-mailing worm that is launched  
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onto a system and propagates over various networks.  Insiders are responsible for the 
misuse of legitimate access.  An example of an insider is a disgruntled employee who 
destroys data after being fired or who breaks into an administrator’s account to access 
confidential information.  Insiders are responsible for approximately 80% of intrusions 
(Wilson, 2001); however, since these attackers are typically not involved with the hacker 
society in which we expect evolution of hacker practices to occur, cases of malicious 
insider attacks will not apply.   
Attack Taxonomy 
 A great deal of time was spent attaining a proper vocabulary for discussing 
computer attacks.  The difficulty here is that no taxonomy is universally accepted.  There 
are also instances where the line separating different types of malicious code is blurred.  
We will see an example of this in our Klez analysis, as Klez is a virus-dropping worm.  
We will assume the following definitions, taken from Hansman and Hunt (2004) 
throughout the remainder of this report. 
• Virus: self-replicating program that propagates by way of infected  files 
• Worm: self-replicating program, able to propagate without the use of infected 
files or user interaction                                       
• Trojan: a program made to appear benign that serves some malicious purpose 
• Buffer Overflow: a process that gains control or crashes another process by 
overflowing the portion of memory set aside to store data during transfers 
• Denial-of-Service attack: prevents legitimate users from accessing or using a host 
or network 
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Classifying & Analyzing Attacks 
We initially spent time reviewing and evaluating previous classification methods 
used in computer security.  Hansman and Hunt (2004) set out the requirements for a 
workable taxonomy.  These requirements were helpful as we evaluated other taxonomies.  
Their own taxonomy used the following characteristics to classify attacks: vector (e.g., 
virus), target (e.g. Windows XP), vulnerabilities, and exploitations.  These categories are 
seen with minor variations in other reports as well.   
 Another attack classification we reviewed was defined by Moitra and Konda 
(2003).  In their study they charted the amount of attacks that occurred at sites over a 
period of time, using the CERT Reports.  They then classified the recorded attacks based 
on: start date, end date, inter-incident time, number of sites, level of incident, method of 
operation, and type of victim site.  From this data they made statistical predictions for the 
particular sites.   
Moore et al. (2001) proposed a method for analyzing particular attacks.  Using 
attack trees, each attack is broken down according to goal, necessary preconditions, steps, 
and post-conditions.  We employed this strategy in order to gain an understanding of the 
dynamics the following major worms: Melissa, Love Letter, Anna Kournikova, Slammer, 
Nimda, Klez, Code Red, and Beagle.  We used the attack tree technique to look broadly 
at each of these attacks to see how they functioned.  Figure 1 is an example of how we 
used attack trees on a simple mass e-mailing worm, Melissa.     
 With a general understanding of worm functioning, we went on to review security 
reports, provided by McAfee and Symantec, and CERT, as well as case studies on the  
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worms.  In some reports, multiple variants of a worm appeared to be virtually identical.  
Puzzled by this, and realizing that there must be some reason to assign a new variant 
name, we sent an e-mail inquiry to the website contacts.  Jimmy Kuo, senior McAfee 
Fellow, explained that an attack will be differentiated as a new variant whenever there is 
a binary difference, meaning a difference in the actual code.  If an attack is compressed, 
polymorphic, or self-corrupting a new variant name will not be applied (personal 
communication, July 7, 2006).  This information came in very helpful when determining 
what types of changes were relevant for our purposes.  
Code Red is a 2001 worm that attempted and failed a denial-of-service attack on 
the White House government website.  It was programmed so that for one week each 
month, all infected systems would attempt to access www.whitehouse.gov.  The massive 
amount of traffic was intended to shut down the website.  This attack receives a lot of 
publicity, probably because of its high-profile target; however, the goal was discovered 
ahead of time and the website was relocated (Moore, 2002).  The effective payloads of 
Code Red were the mass e-mails to slow networks and the defacement of various 
websites to make the attack known. 
The main change that took place between Code Red, Code Red version 2, and Code Red 
II, seems to be related to its propagation.  In order to mass e-mail itself, Code Red would 
scan IP addresses for vulnerable hosts.  In the first version the “random” generator used a 
static seed, meaning that each time it scanned it would generate the same list of internet 
protocol (IP) addresses.  This stunted its spreading area, as well as, made it easy to track   
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the course of its propagation.  In the second version, a random seed was used to alleviate  
this problem.  Version 2 spread far more efficiently since it attempted more systems and 
did not waste as much time attempting to infect already infected systems.  The IP scan 
written for Code Red II, the third version, allowed it to spread even further by avoiding 
most local systems, relative to the infected host, that would probably already be infected.  
While quite costly to clean up, the Code Red family was not of particular interest to us 
because of its lack of evolution.        
Slammer was an extremely powerful worm launched in 2003.  This was the first 
worm seen to send itself as a UDP packet.  Previous worms, such as Code Red, mainly 
used TCP, transmission control protocol, packets to scan for vulnerable systems and send 
themselves.  TCP is a connection-oriented data transfer system.  It is more reliable, but 
less efficient than UDP because it is latency-limited.  Once a TCP packet is sent out there 
is a waiting period while a response is generated, before more packets can be sent.  UDP, 
user datagram protocol, packets, on the other hand, are connectionless.  These packets are 
bandwidth-limited, meaning that they can send continuous packets as fast as the system 
allows for, without waiting for any responses (Moore, 2003).  Slammer recognized and 
used this difference in order to maximize its spreading speed. 
 Nimda was an extremely successful attack.  This is because it was a blended 
attack, spreading by e-mail, shared files, web servers, and IP targeting.  The variants of 
Nimda appear to vary only slightly, probably because it combined various mechanisms 
from the start.  We reviewed SANS White Papers, such as Poore’s (2001) report, which 
analyzed this intricate attack.  While Nimda was not a useful attack for this research, it  
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was helpful to see the way that Nimda writers combined techniques.  It seems to us that 
the authors learned from earlier attacks that capitalized on a particular aspect and  
combined the mechanisms in one super attack.      
A Successful Attack 
After an extensive review of these and other attacks, we felt ready to identify the 
main goals of a hacker when creating a worm.  A successful worm attack must be able to 
propagate quickly, execute successfully, and complete its intended payload.  With these 
goals in mind we were ready to delve into particular attacks to see how these goals are 
reached over time. 
We selected Klez and Bagle to chart and study because each family consisted of 
many variants.  Bakes’ (2003) analysis of Klez.H, the most prominent of the Klez family, 
included a chart that pictured the way each variant propagated and which payload each 
carried.  While these charts did not include the level of detail that we would look for, they 
did help motivate our original chart.  Bakes cited TrendMicro as his data source.  This 
security company was one we had not heard of before, but we found that the reports  
included more detail than McAfee, Symantec, and CERT.  In gathering data on both Klez 
and Bagle, we used TrendMicro reports, cross-referencing with the other databases.  The  
charts that we have compiled are the first of this kind and should serve as the foundation 
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RESULTS 
Worm Characteristics 
 Drawing on the information we collected on various worms, we compiled a list of 
attach characteristics that we would look at in our charts of Klez and Bagle.  We 
organized this list into the three main categories: Propagation, Execution, and Payload.  
Propagation refers to mechanisms employed to spread the worm.  Execution deals with 
the way it loads itself and remains on a system.  Payload includes what the worm does 
once it is on a system.  Figure 2 is an example of this list.  The terms used in the outline 
are defined here, 
• Scan- automated series of targets in order to find which have a certain 
characteristic, usually to determine which are vulnerable targets  
• Encrypted- some change to data, code, or a file that requires it to be processed, or 
decrypted, before a system can read it  
• Compression- minimized in size so that less memory is needed to send or store it 
• E-Mail- this is clear, mass e-mailing is the main propagation method of worms; 
they can be written to steal addresses off the host to mail to, search for vulnerable 
IP addresses to target, use a spoofed return address to trick recipients, and to use a 
simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) or an internet mail access protocol (IMAP) 
• File Attachment- e-mails may carry a file attachment containing the worm code; 
the worm will be executed when the file is downloaded or previewed 
• HTML Coded- worms using this mechanism will automatically download the 
worm from a specified website when the e-mail is opened 
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• Added to Registry- when a worm writes itself to the system registry key it 
guarantees that it will be executed each time the system is rebooted  
• Written to System Files- worms may write themselves to system files and reside 
there in memory 
• Mutex- this mechanism ensures that only one copy of the worm will run at a time 
• Self-Updating- worms are able to access websites to update themselves and stay 
on a system longer 
• Overwrites Files with Zeros- this payload replaces data in files with zeros 
• Overwrites Files with Self- this payload replaces data in files with its own code 
• Shared File Infection- this payload writes worm code to any shared files on a 
system so that other users will be infected when they access these  
• Disables/Terminates Anti-Virus Programs- this payload stops anti-virus software 
that is running on the system so that it will not detect the worm’s presence 
• Deletes Anti-Virus Files- this payload permanently deletes anti-virus programs  
• Remote Access- this payload opens up a port or ports, also referred to as a 
backdoor, on the infected system allowing the attacker access to the system  
 
Worm characteristics are not limited to our list because there are some characteristics 
that will be specific to certain worms.  For example, Klez carries the payload of a 
“Companion Infection.”  This characteristic is included in our chart of Klez, but not in  
the general list because it is specific to Klez.  Also, all characteristics in this list will not 
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be included in all charts because they are not all relevant to every worm.  Klez does not 
involve any mutex mechanisms and so this characteristic is left off of the Klez chart.  
Characteristics that do not change during an entire family of attacks will also not be 
shown on our charts.  In every version of Klez, for example, the worm wrote itself to the 
system registry during execution.  Since this static characteristic tells us nothing about the 
evolution of the attack, it is not included in our chart. 
Klez 
Klez is a virus-carrying worm that has existed in ten different versions.  Table 1 is 
our resulting chart of this family.  Klez propagates by mass e-mailing and shared file 
infections.  Authors exploit a vulnerability that causes a file to be executed when 
previewed in the Microsoft Outlook window.   Immediately, the worm loads itself to the 
system memory and writes itself to the registry.  Before e-mailing itself or corrupting 
system files, Klez lies dormant for a few days.  This may be a stealth mechanism, since 
once the payload is completed, one would be unlikely to link the problem to an e-mail 
received days before.   
 Our chart of the Klez family depicts the changes that occurred between variants.  
Slight changes in propagation techniques are visible.  Initially, in versions A and C, the 
worm was programmed to conduct a scan of all the drives on a host computer.  Both of  
these attempts failed.  Klez never attempted a system scan again.  Encryption was not 
consistently used, but was employed in half of the variants.  All but two accomplished the 
mass e-mailing procedure.  Klez.J attempted and failed, but was also written to infect  
shared files, allowing it to propagate in this way.  Version B does not attempt to mass  
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e-mail or to infect shared files, leaving it with no hope of propagation.  Actually, Klez.B 
appears to serve the sole purpose of gaining remote access – the only in the family with 
this payload.  Unlike its siblings, it does not mass e-mail, infect files, or affect anti-virus 
software.  We speculate that the first three versions were attempts to gain information 
about systems before launching full blown attacks.    
 Klez harvests e-mail addresses to send itself to from the Windows Address Book 
(WAB) on the host computer.  In three variants it also retrieves them from 17 other files, 
in an attempt to spread to even more systems with each infection.  The address appearing 
in the “From:” field of e-mail also changed between versions.  Initially, a random address 
found in the worm body was used.  Later, to avoid suspicion, Klez would spoof the 
“From:” address with the address of an uninfected user found on the host’s computer.  
For example, if Sue was infected by Klez, and Bob and Harry are both in her address 
book, an e-mail sent out from Sue’s computer will go to Harry and others, but it will 
appear to come from Bob.  While Bob may be harassed about sending out a worm that 
didn’t actually come from him, Sue may still be unaware that she is infected.  Early on, 
propagation by e-mail employed one of the simple mail transfer protocol (SMTP) engines 
embedded in the e-mail, namely yahoo, hotmail, or sina.  Later it narrowed this to send  
with the same engine of the spoofed return address.  By the later versions, Klez was 
written to retrieve and use the SMTP engine that was used by the host computer.   
 The payload of Klez is the dropping of the ElKern virus.  ElKern is a polymorphic 
virus, meaning that it evades detection by automatically modifying its code every time it  
replicates.  When it is dropped ElKern infects files, copies itself into the Windows       
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System folder, and encrypts itself.  It also writes itself to the registry so that it will run, 
infecting random files, every time the system is rebooted.  Early Klez variants carried the 
first version of ElKern, which overwrote the information contained in files with zeros 
while maintaining the original file sizes to avoid detection.  The second version, 
ElKern.B, was virtually the same in effect, but included an algorithm to avoid infecting 
self-infecting .rar and .zip files.  Self-extracting files are able to extract themselves each 
time they run.  This would seem to make the virus visible anytime an infected file was 
run.  Later, ElKern.C is dropped, but this third version contains no destructive payload.  It 
does not write itself to the registry and it does not infect files.  The final Klez variant 
returns to dropping the previous (destructive) virus, ElKern.B.   
Most versions of Klez also perform the task of infecting shared files on a system.  
Whenever another user accesses these shared files, they will be infected, providing a 
second propagation mechanism.  Klez enables itself to propagate undetected for spans of 
time by attacking anti-virus software on infected hosts.  The first Klez disables anti-virus  
programs.  Version C is written to disable them each time the system reboots.  The next 
variant disables anti-virus programs and also removes them from the registry so that they  
will fail to run upon later reboots.  Beyond that, with the exception of Klez.J, anti-virus 
programs are disabled and entirely deleted from the system.   
The last three versions of Klez contain a payload referred to as a companion 
infection.  This type of infection first compresses a targeted executable file, replacing the 
extension .EXE with a random extension.  It then sets the file properties to Read-only,  
                 
          Attack Evolution      20 
Hidden, System, and Archive.  These settings keep the clean file from being easily visible 
to the user.  The worm then copies itself into the original filename so that the host will 
run it.  
  Klez.H was the most successful variant, infecting over 3 million systems since its 
release on April 17, 2002.  Its authors optimized their product in this version, spreading 
to an enormous area.  Propagation advances included spoofing the “From:” field and 
using the SMTP engine of the host, in order to encourage more recipients to open the 
message.  It also infected shared files to provide a second propagation method.  This 
version not only disabled, but also totally deleted anti-virus programs on the infected 
system to avoid being detected.  While it dropped the less effective ElKern version C, it 
employed the unique Klez companion infection in order to infect and remain undetected 
on various areas of the system memory.   
 Overall, it appears that Bagle authors initially optimized the way the e-mail was 
sent, focusing on addresses, spoofing, and engines.  Next, they attempted to increase 
execution success by using the improved version of ElKern.  The third focal point was 
detection avoidance, which they dealt with first by optimizing the anti-virus attack and 
then by developing the companion infection payload.   
Bagle 
 Bagle, referred to by some as Beagle, is a mass e-mailing worm seen in sixty-two 
versions.  Our chart of the Bagle family has been broken down into Table 2, variants A 
through Z, Table 3, variants AB through AZ, and Table 4, variants BA through BY for 
viewing purposes.  One explanation for the large number of variants is that each Bagle 
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is written to infect computers within a relatively short time frame.  For example, the first 
variant was reported on January 18, 2004, and is written to be active only through 
January 28, 2004.  If it reaches a computer on or after the latter date, it terminates itself.  
This mechanism also allows Bagle better chances of avoiding detection.  Using our chart  
we are able to recognize some trends in the formulation of Bagle.  We can also recognize 
various characteristics that authors played with a few times, but ultimately abandoned.  
 During propagation, Bagle seems to favor compression over encryption as a 
stealth mechanism.  Once executed, Bagle scans for vulnerable IP addresses to target.  In 
about a third of the versions, an external domain name system (DNS) is accessed at a 
particular IP address in order to resolve vulnerable addresses.  Over time this system is 
located at three different locations. 
All Bagle variants attempted mass e-mailing.  Address harvesting changes 
significantly over the course of the Bagle family as authors try different approaches.  
Initially, Bagle is written to access only four types of files in search of addresses.  At 
times it is written to search as many as thirty-one different types of files.  At one point, 
Bagle tries to access only two file types, with version AF.  Later, in a very unsuccessful 
attempt, Bagle.BN accesses the file P:\Emails only.  Towards the end of the family, 
variants tend to access only the Windows Address Book (WAB).  Four variants do not 
harvest any addresses from the host, but instead access a list of addresses on a particular 
website.  A few versions combine the WAB addresses with this internet list.  All versions 
are written to avoid sending to any addresses that contained certain strings, such as  
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 “@symantec” and “admin,” not wanting to send to the wrong people – those trained to 
detect a worm.   
Early on Bagle e-mails itself with a particular spoofing technique.  When it 
harvests a list of addresses, say on Sue’s computer, the first e-mail might appear to be 
sent from Bob to Bob, the second from Bob to Harry, the third from Harry to Martha, and  
so on.  E-mails never appeared to come from the actual infected user.  This spoofing 
technique also makes it extremely difficult to track propagation.   
Typically Bagle e-mails contain a file attachment carrying the worm code.  In 
many versions authors use password-protected files.  The password is contained within 
the body of the e-mail.  This is probably intended to lure the recipients to open the file.  A 
password-protected file may seem to be more trustworthy or simply enticing to users.  At 
one point, in variant X, authors attach the infected file along with a clean file, again, 
probably as bait for recipients.  In version Q, Bagle began exploiting a PopUp Window 
vulnerability that allowed the worm to be downloaded from a website once the HTML-
coded e-mail was viewed.  HTML-coding is first employed along with file attachments, 
then alone, and eventually authors return to using file attachments alone. 
Mutexes are programs that allow only one program of similar type to run at a time.  
Early on, a mutex is included in the code of many Bagle versions in order to block two 
copies of itself from running at a time.  This is most likely a way to avoid detection, 
considering that the memory used to run multiple copies of worm code would slow down 
a system tremendously.  Many of the Bagle variants are also able to update themselves by  
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accessing a website and running the UPD command.  They would also access a website 
and send information to the hacker to notify him of systems he has reached.       
A main payload of Bagle is the achievement of remote access on a system.  Over 
time the targeted TCP port changes.  Versions AF, AH, and AJ also open remote access 
on a UDP port.  Beginning with Bagle.F, over half of the variants infect all files whose 
names include the string “shar,” allowing propagation to occur over network shares.  All  
versions of Bagle infect system files, in order to remain in memory.  Versions N through 
T also infect executable files on the system.  Version T compresses the executable files 
once it infects them.  This payload may be destructive, but it is not desirable enough to be 
repeated on many later versions.  Bagle.BB modifies HOST files so that a user is unable 
to access anti-virus and security updating websites.  It is also written to monitor all 
internet browsing done on the infected system.  Only six versions of Bagle do not attack 
anti-virus software.  All others disable the running programs and version AE even deletes 
the programs from memory.  More than half of the variants also attempt to access a large 
number of websites.  This payload may cause internet traffic and slow down networks.  
Over a third of the Bagle variants combine programs by carrying a Trojan or virus.  
Five versions carried with them a polymorphic virus and twenty carried a trojan.  These 
versions affect systems as the others, but they work in conjunction with the additional 
programs with Bagle being mainly responsible for the propagation.  
By version N, reported on March 3, 2004, less than three months after the first 
report of Bagle, a new trend in the family appears.  Bagle code began to attack the worm 
NetSky.  This worm, which is very similar to Bagle, was first reported about a month  
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after the first Bagle.  The two have since engaged in an “internet skirmish”, according to 
reports at Sophos (2004).  Most Bagle versions, following N, deletes NetSky code from 
infected systems.  Bagle.AC deleted not just NetSky, but also the mutex that NetSky 
installs.  AD installs a mutex, as earlier Bagle versions had.  This mutex, however, was 
intended to block NetSky, not Bagle, code from running.          
It seems that the focus of Bagle authors changed over the course of this worm.  
Initially, the e-mail propagation underwent changes to the sources for addresses 
harvesting and spoofing techniques.  Eventually, authors also had a focused list of 
recipients that they consistently used.  Relatively early on authors perfected the shared 
file infection and spread technique.  Then, changes were made to the mode of execution.  
Authors tried password protection on file attachments for quite awhile and eventually 
attempted HTML-coded e-mails as well.  Stealth approaches, including compression, 
anti-virus attacks, and mutexes, were refined over time.  Once the worm seemed to be 
functioning well, attention was placed on the emerging NetSky battle.   
Towards the end of the Bagle family charted here, variants seemed to level out, probably 
to what the authors are finding to be most effective for their current goals.  The 
seemingly ideal Bagle is an e-mail carrying a compressed file to addresses stored on a 
designated website and in the user’s WAB.  Its main goal appears to be to stop NetSky 
from running on the infected system, disable anti-virus software, and to set up remote 
access.  
The Driving Force 
 Within the categories of Propagation, Execution, and Payload, we can see what 
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characteristics seem to drive changes.  Regardless of its intended payload, the main goal 
of a worm is to spread.  This goal affects all three categories.  Within propagation, 
changes are made to find as many vulnerable hosts as possible.  Changes are made in 
selecting harvesting sites as well as in what techniques are used to hide the identity of the 
worm.  Compression and spoofing are important factors.  Within execution, changes are 
made to the way code is written to a system.  In order to continue spreading, the worm 
must achieve infection.  Again, authors play with the infection methods to find what 
works best to ensure the worm is executed.  Payloads vary, from destructing files to 
opening systems, but one thing that appears to be crucial is anti-virus attacks.  In order to  
maximize its spreading ability, a worm must be able to remain resident on a system 
without being detected long enough find future hosts and begin spreading to them.   
It all comes down to propagation.  Worms must be capable of spreading quickly, 
but also to a large area.  For instance, if a worm spread very quickly, but only hit a few 
networks, it would be stopped once administrators in these networks patched the  
vulnerability.  By spreading quickly and to distant networks, a worm can evade patches 
longer.  If a worm is written to spread quickly, but is easily recognized as a worm, either 
by anti-virus detection or by individual users, it will also not spread and so various stealth 
mechanisms are needed.  It is clear that authors try out different combinations, learn from 
mistakes, and replicate successes in order to achieve powerful propagation.  Once  
propagation is optimized, hackers may add their desired payloads, ultimately developing 
a successful product. 
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LIMITATIONS of this RESEARCH 
 In researching these attacks, we found that there are discrepancies between 
company reports.  Not all databases will agree upon variant names.  For example, 
Bagle.AC reported by Trend Micro on August 9, 2004, is recorded on the Symantec 
database as Bagle.AO, and on McAfee as Beagle.AQ.  As stated, we used TrendMicro 
databases as our main source of information; therefore, our names and dates are aligned 
with these reports.  The inconsistency among sources poses a challenge to future research 
in this area.  There are also noticeable holes in our charts.  The explanation, for example,  
for not including Bagle.AP, is simply that no report exists.   
 In order to find evolutionary patterns, more families than will need to be 
researched.  Any trends or patterns stated here are speculations at this point.  More data 
will need to be gathered in order to draw valid conclusions.  It should also be noted that 
within the Bagle family, variants do not necessarily fall in chronological order.  For 
example, Bagle.AO was actually reported six months after the  
BY version.  Variant U does not fall in line with the progression of the other variants, as 
it appears to be an original Bagle prototype.  The reason for these inconsistencies is also 
not clear; however the time delay in reporting should be noted.  The dates listed on our 
charts are the dates that TrendMicro received samples of the attacks and began analyzing 
them.  The dates that the attacks were originally released by the hackers are unknown. 
 It should be noted that further Bagle variants exist beyond the versions we charted.  
After completing the Bagle chart of variants A through BY, we came across evidence that 
Bagle may actually be a single piece in a larger network of attacks.  Molenkamp and  
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O’Dea (2005) revealed that the Bagle we studied served the purpose of mass mailing in a 
larger scheme, pictured in Figure 3.  Another piece serves to download from the internet 
and another to gather information.  This may explain why certain features were 
abandoned over time.  For example, we found that the payload of remote access dropped 
off in time; however, this may be because Mitglieder was imposed in the Bagle network 
to serve this distinct purpose.  Hackers are assumed to be making profit off this scheme 
by using many weakly protected computers as launch sites for destructive attacks on 
companies.    
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 To continue with this project, we would recommend charting the NetSky family 
and conducting a comparative study between this and the Bagle family.  Because the two 
are caught in a competition, it will be useful to examine which approaches have been 
successful in putting one ahead of the other in the worm race.  Combining will allow for  
insight into how the hackers learn, not only from their own mistakes and successes, but 
also from each other’s.  As further case studies are done on this competition, it will be 
interesting to see what the motivation is.  Are the attackers caught in an originality 
draught, forced to copy each other?  Are they caught up in the rush of competition?  Or, 
is this cyber war intended to distract analysts from the bigger picture – the suspected 
underground of thousands of infected machines?  Understanding this might lend further 
insight into how these attackers learn and play off of each other. 
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While we have not defined specific evolutionary patterns, our research has shown 
that these patterns may, and probably do, exist.  Our charts are the first step in 
approaching families of attacks in this way.  Due to time restraints on this research, 
further analysis of these charts has not yet been completed.  Charts of other families 
should be created using our worm characteristics.  Diagramming and probabilistic 
analyses can then be applied to all of the charts in order to extract evolutionary patterns 
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Figure 1. Melissa Virus Attack Tree 
 
Melissa Virus (1999) 
Goal: shut down Internet mail systems by clogging with infected e-mails 
Precondition: user has either Microsoft Outlook ’97, ’98, or Microsoft Word ’97 or 
2000 
Attack:  1. user downloads LIST.DOC attachment 
      AND 2. User opens worm containing file 
              3. Worm executes by 
                1. mailing LIST.DOC to first 50 recipients in Outlook address book 
           OR 2. spreading to Word file documents and mailing these 
Post-condition: Internet mail systems clog 












































Figure 2. Worm Characteristics 
 Propagation 
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 File Attachment 
 attachment previewed 
 attachment opened 
 HTML Coded 
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 Shared File Infection 
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